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INTERFERON AND ITS FIRST CLINICAL TRIAL:
LOOKING BEHIND THE SCENES
by
TOINE PIETERS *
On the morning of 25 March 1980, there was unusual activity at Glasgow airport's
Customs. Aparcel containing abottleofthemostvaluabledrug intheworld, interferon, had
justarrivedfromDenmark. Hailed as apossible cureforcancer, interferon was intendedfor
the experimental treatment of two young patients with advanced cancer at the Royal
Hospital for Sick Children in Glasgow.' The event stirred widespread attention in the
British press in the late seventies andearly eighties, and was part ofa global mediahype of
interferon'spromise asa"magicbullet" againstcancer.2 Sometypicalheadlineswere: "The
drug with a value beyond price"3 and "The miracle cure of the future?".4 The euphoria
surrounding interferon faded when it appeared that the drug's performance in large-scale
cancer trials had been disappointing, and that it often produced severe side effects in
patients.5
Interferon had hit the headlines for the first time in Britain about twenty years earlier. In
May 1958, Alick Isaacs, a virus researcher at the National Institute of Medical Research
(NIMR), Mill Hill, London, announced the finding of an inhibitor ofvirus growth, named
interferon. Subsequently, the press reported the discovery of a substance which might one
day play an important part in the fightagainstviruses, apotential new "antiviral penicillin".
Thispossibility was an important incentive forthe immediate startofnegotiations between
the Medical Research Council (MRC), which was responsible forNIMR's activities, and a
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numberofmajorBritishdrugcompanies. TheMRCdidnothavetheresourcesandexpertise
to develop interferon as an antiviral drug and therefore sought collaboration with industry.
During the war a consortium of British pharmaceutical companies, incorporated as the
Therapeutic Research Corporation, had collaborated on a penicillin development
programme, but there did not exist a peacetime model for such a collaboration. Hence, the
National Defense Research Development Corporation was entrusted with the task of
making proposals for an agreement between the MRC and a selection of British drug
companies.
In order to develop and carry out a collaborative research programme, a Scientific
Committeeoninterferon was setupunderthechairmanship ofIsaacs. Inthe courseof 1960,
the scientific committee gave the go-ahead to prepare experiments with interferon on
humans. In the first suchexperiment, which was carriedoutduring January 1962, the effect
ofinterferon on vaccination was tested on volunteers. Shortly afterwards, on 28 April 1962
areportofthis trial was publishedintheLancetwhich maintained thatthe clinical trial with
interferon was based on unambiguous experiments with an antiviral substance in,
successively, the test-tube (in vitro) and laboratory animals (in vivo). The transition
between in vitro and in vivo tests, and tests on humans was depicted as unproblematic. In
addition, the experiment was said to show that interferon had an antiviral effect in man.
Inretracing interferon'sorigin anddevelopments uptothe 1962 trial, I focus attention on
two issues. First, the contingencies and uncertainties faced during laboratory and clinical
practice are elucidated. In general there are erased frompublished scientific papers like the
Lancetreport. Thus, I show thatthe transition between in vitro and in vivo tests, andtests on
humans was far from unproblematic, thereby demonstrating that self-evidence in bio-
medical experiments and experimental transitions is a scientific myth. Second, some
aspectsofthefirstsuccessfulpostwarinitiative to secure acollaborationbetweenthe British
government and the drug industry are highlighted.
THE LANCET REPORT
EFFECT OF INTERFERON ON VACCINATION IN VOLUNTEERS
A Report to the Medical Research Council from the Scientific Committee on Interferon
Interferon is known to be produced in the course ofmany virus infections both in vitro and
in animals, and it is thought to play a role in recovery from viral infections. It therefore
seemed possible that it might one day find a use in the treatment ofvirus infections in man
and animals. In exploring this possibility we have carried out a first experiment to see
whether interferon prepared in the laboratory could prevent the establishment of a virus
infection in man.6
These are the opening lines of an article in the Lancet, 28 April 1962. Subsequently, the
reader is informed about the production of both interferon and a control fluid without
interferon, the assays ofinterferon, the safety tests, andfinally aboutthe conduct ofthe trial.
The safety tests were carried out both during and at the end of the production process.
During it, theresearchers tested forthepresence ofviruses andbacteria; samplesofthe final
6 Scientific Committee on Interferon, 'Effect of interferon on vaccination in volunteers', Laoncet, 1962, i:
873-5, p. 873.
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product were taken for toxicity tests in mice and guinea-pigs; and, as a final test, the
interferon, as well as the control fluid, was inoculated into the forearm ofvolunteers. Apart
from a single case of swelling, no side effects were registered.
The trial was performed as follows. The interferon preparation and a control preparation
without interferon, which looked alike, were coded according to a random list of coding
letters and were distributed "blind" together with vaccine by the MRC's immunological
products control laboratory in Hampstead. Subsequently, all the participating laboratories
recruited volunteers who each received two injections with either interferon or the control
fluid in one arm, 5 cm apart. The nextday they were given vaccinationsagainstsmallpox at
the same arm sites. For a fortnight afterwards, frequent readings of both arm spots were
made and any lesions that developed were measured and noted. The observer and the
vaccinator were different people so as to ensure that the observer would read the vaccine
takes "blind". Thus the test procedure was a "double blind". Finally, the volunteer records
were returned to the distribution laboratory, where the codes had been kept. The results
prompted the following conclusion:
Definite evidence ofprotection by interferon was found and since the trials werecarried out
blind it is clear that the protective effects can be accepted as unbiased results.7
In addition to this conclusion, the report added a discussion ofboth the trial and its results:
The present trial was based on experiments in animals where it had been shown that
interferon could preventthedevelopmentofavaccinial lesion inthe skinoftherabbitandof
the monkey. Monkey interferon was known to inhibit virus growth in human cells in vitro
and it was therefore used in this trial.8
To put itbriefly, according to the report, the clinical trial with interferon wascarried out as a
result of unambiguous experiments with an antiviral substance in the laboratory. The
transition from experiments in the test-tube and in laboratory animals to experiments with
humans was depicted as unproblematic. In addition, the trial was said to have proceeded
smoothly and unmistakably showed that interferon had an antiviral effect in man.
Recentstudies in thehistory andsociology ofscience which have examined thepath from
laboratory to published scientific paper have convincingly shown that scientific
communications to learned journals have to be regarded as retrospective experimental
narratives, which comply with stereotyped formats and do not accurately represent the
research work made public.9 Published scientific accounts are reconstructions rather than
records ofthe actual investigative pathway, andby reconstructing the research process into
Ibid., pp. 874-5.
8 Ibid., p. 875.
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a linear order ofexperimental narratives, procedures and choices are rendered invisible. In
addition, printed public records lack the contingencies and uncertainties which scientists
constantly face during their work and the subsequent management (negotiation) of
uncertainty. Despite the fact that these studies have pointed out, and to some degree
analysed the process of the deletion of uncertainty from scientific texts, this deletion
process has only occasionally beendescribed with reference tothe details oflaboratory and
clinical practice. The same is true for the varieties ofuncertainties faced by scientists.'0 In
the case ofthe Lancet report this invites the following questions. How unambiguous were the
experiments which preceded the interferon trial? Are the transitions between experiments in
vitro and in vivo and on humans as self-evident as the report would have us believe? Or, in
broader terms, what kind ofuncertainties lie hidden behind the "Lancet screen" ofobjective,
rule-bound science? In order to recover contingencies and uncertainties which have been
deleted from the public record and answer these questions, I will retrace interferon's origin
anddevelopmentup tothe vaccination trial onthebasis ofminutes, interviews, personal notes
andcorrespondence. Moreover, the reconsideration oftheearly history ofinterferon research
will highlight some aspects ofthe first successful postwar initiative to set up a collaboration
between the British government and the drug industry.
RETRACING INTERFERON'S ORIGIN
Early in 1957, in one ofthe laboratories ofthe NIMR, Alick Isaacs completed a series of
two articles for the Proceedings ofthe Royal Society. Together with Jean Lindenmann, a
Swiss virologist, he claimed to have found a new biological factor during a study of the
interference phenomenon. This biological phenomenon had first been namedby the British
scientists Gerald Findlay and Frank MacCallum in 1937." Findlay and MacCallum had
observed that infection with Rift Valley fever virus protected monkeys from infection with
the unrelated yellow fever virus. Their phenomenon was defined as the interference of one
virus with the pathogenic action ofanother, hence the name "interference phenomenon".'2
The interference phenomenon had been studied mostextensively in the developing chicken
egg, ever since in the 1940s, the American virologists Werner and Gertrude Henle had
shown that the interference phenomenon could be studied most conveniently in that test
system, free from many of the complicating factors in laboratory animals. These often
became cross-infected, carried undetected virus infections, and were argued to have more
complicated defence reactions, which intervened to confuse the experimental data.
Moreover, as an experimental system, the chicken egg was easier to manipulate and more
economical. Initially there had been discussions concerning the extent to which the results
obtained in the chicken egg had a bearing on the interference phenomena in laboratory
"' Susan Lee Star has been the first to point out the neglect of the role and the varieties of uncertainty in
laboratory and clinical practice in: Regions of the mind: brain research anid the questfor scienitific certaintY,
Stanford University Press, 1989, pp. 64-5.
'' In retrospect one may find earlier observations concerning inhibition phenomena between viruses, both in
animals and plants. These observations go back even to the pre-bacteriologic era: see W. Henle, 'Interference
phenomena between animal viruses: a review', J. lin/nun., 1950, 64: 203-35, p. 205. For instance, in 1804 the
famous British doctor Jenner reported in a letter to the editors ofthe Medical anid PhYsical Journal observations
which led him to believe that "herpetic affections often prevented the vaccine virus from producing its correct
action", E. Jenner, letter to the Editor, Med. and Phys. J., 1804, 12: 97-102, p. 97.
2 G. M. Findlay and F. 0. MacCallum, 'An interference phenomenon in relation to yellow fever and other
viruses', J. Path. and Bact., 1937, 44: 405-24, p. 420.
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animals, but, as the use of the chicken egg spread, the uncertainty regarding this
experimental transition faded into the background.'3
Isaacs was in charge ofthe laboratory ofthe World Influenza Centre, which was part of
the NIMR's division of Bacteriology and Virus Research, and had been set up in
collaboration with the World HealthOrganisation (WHO) as the centreofaglobal network
ofcollaborating laboratories to study influenza viruses. These were heldresponsible forthe
outbreak ofvarious flu epidemics throughout the world. Inside the World Influenza Centre
all sorts ofdataconcemingfluepidemics were accumulated, togetherwithvirus specimens,
in order to elucidate the epidemiology and nature of influenza viruses, and, ultimately, to
control the outbreak offlu epidemics.14 In the early fifties, Isaacs had studied extensively
the interference phenomenon between the inactivated influenza virus (which had been
rendered non-infective by heat) and the live influenza virus in the developing egg. In these
studies he had ascribed the interference phenomenon, which by then was characterized as
the inhibitory effect of one virus upon the propagation of another, to the competition
between an interfering (inactivated) and a challenging (live) virus for some key-
constituent within the cell. Lindenmann, a visiting research worker from the Institute of
Microbiology ofthe University ofZurich, hadbeen involved inexperiments with influenza
virus in the chicken egg showing that heat-inactivated virus interfered with the growth of
live virus even when stuck to the surface of red blood cells.
Sometime in August 1956 Lindenmann was introduced to Isaacs and told him about his
observation that inactivated influenza virus attached to red blood cells was a good
interfering agent. To the best of Lindenmann's memory, Isaacs showed an enthusiastic
interest and suggested two possible explanations for this finding. The virus could have
become detached from the red blood cells during the experiment and induced interference
by entering the cell as a whole, or the virus coat (virus haemagglutinin) might have
remained firmly attached to the red cells, while only the virus content (virus nucleic acid)
had entered the cell and induced interference. This latter assumption was prompted by the
idea that in analogy with bacterial viruses (bacteriophages),'5 during infection with
influenza virus only the virus nucleic acid entered the host cell, while the virus coat
remained outside. Lindenmann's experiment seemed to offer a unique opportunity to test
Isaacs' assumption. Isaacs then asked Lindenmann whether he would like to work on
influenza viruses and, if possible, test the "nucleic acid hypothesis".'6
'3 Henle, op. cit., note I I above, pp. 216-18; Sally Smith Hughes, The virus: a history ofthe concept, London
and New York, Heinemann Educational Books, Science History Publications, 1977, p. 93; W. Schlessinger,
'Interference between animal viruses', in F. M. Burnet and W. M. Stanley (ed.), The viruses, New York,
Academic Press, 1959, pp. 157-94.
'4 C. Andrewes, 'Alick Isaacs', Biogracphical Memoirs of Fellows ofthe Royal Society, 1967, 13: 205-32.
' Probablythiswaspromptedbynewdevelopments inthefieldofvirology. In 1952,AlfredHersheyandMartha
Chase had shown that during bacterial virus infection only the virus content entered the cell, while the protein
coat remained at the surface. They believed the virus nucleic acid to be directing the viral reproduction. By 1956,
within the field of virology consensus had emerged over the study ofbacterial viruses as a simple model for virus
multiplication and a possible key to the elucidation of virus-host systems; it was fashionable to think that animal
virus infections proceeded in a similar way to bacterial virus infections. See, T. van Helvoort, 'History of virus
research in the 20th century: the problem of conceptual continuity', forthcoming in History ofScience; Jean
Lindenmann, interview, Zurich, 11-15 June 1990.
16 A. Isaacs, 'Viral interference', Symp. Soc. Gen. Microbiol., 1959, No. 9, 102-21, p. 108; J. Lindenmann,
'Neuere Aspekte de Virus-Interferenz', Z. Hyg. Infektionskrankh., 1960, 146: 369-97, p. 383; J. Lindenmann,
'Induction of chick interferon: procedures of the original experiments', Methods in Enzymology, 1981, 78:
274Interferon and itsfirst clinical trial
Isaacs' notebook has an entry for 4 September 1956 where he says that he and
Lindenmann started with an experiment to see ifvirus-coated red blood cells could induce
interference in the test-tube.'7 Technically, this first collaborative experiment differed
substantially from Lindenmann's original interference experiment. First, Isaacs decided
that instead of doing the experiment in chicken eggs, they would try a novel system for
influenzavirus multiplication. This new experimental model hadbeen applied successfully
inanumberofviral interference experimentsbyhisfriendDavidTyrrell and was said to be
muchmoreconvenientandeasiertomanipulate.18Thechickenembryo membranefromthe
whole egg was removed and cut into pieces. Five eggs produced about thirty pieces of
membrane. Thesesmallpiecesoftissue werethenwashedin adishandadded, one at atime,
to a test-tube filled with a special nutrient fluid. This could be done very fast and by a
laboratory technician. Subsequently, the virus or the controls were injected into the
test-tubes and these rolledovernight in so-called rollerdrums. The next day the fluid could
be taken out of the tubes and the amount of virus quantified.'9 This new experimental
procedure required roughly one-sixth of the usual amount of fertilized eggs, thus saving
both money and space. In addition, experiments on the whole egg required far more skill
and time than the manipulations with the pieces of membrane in the test-tube. Further, it
was argued that the in vitro system could be more readily quantified and manipulated.
A second difference from the original experiment was to stick the interfering
(heat-inactivated) virus tohaemolysedredbloodcells,20so-calledredcell ghosts, insteadof
normal blood cells. By attaching the virus to red cell ghosts, Isaacs and a worker from the
biophysics and optics department had managed some years before to visualize influenza
virus particles.2' They had made a series of electron micrographs with the electron
microscope, showing red cell ghosts with distinctive round structures on them, which were
saidtorepresentvirusparticles. Isaacshopedthatby sticking the interfering virus toredcell
ghostsitwouldbepossible toobtainsimilarclearpicturesofthevirus-coated redcellghosts
in his experiment with Lindenmann. If, as Isaacs assumed, during interference only the
virus nucleic acid22 entered the host cell, while the virus coat remained firmly attached to
the red cell ghosts, they would be able to see full round virus structures before, and
collapsed structures afterthe interference hadtaken place. Furthermore, Isaacs decided that
181-8, p. 182; J. Lindenmann, 'From interference to interferon: a brief historical introduction', Phil. Tranis. R.
Soc. Lond., 299: 3-6, p. 3.
1' A. Isaacs, Laboratory Notebooks, 1946-65, National Library of Medicine (Bethesda), Film number: reel
91-28, Lab Note Book, S.O. Book 135, Code 28-72-0, 'Alick Isaacs Interference Expts. V', 4 September 1956.
1 Lindenmann interview, see note 15 above; D. Tyrrell and 1. Tamm, 'Prevention of virus interference by
2,5-Dimethylbenzimidazole', J. Immun., 1955, 75: 43-9, p. 43; David Tyrrell, interview, Salisbury, 21 May 1990.
'9 Anindicationofthe amountofvirus inatest-tubefluidcouldbeobtainedbymakingaseriesofdilutionsofthe
fluid and adding a constant volume offowl red blood cells to each dilution. Since red blood cells had been shown
toagglutinate proportionally to the numberofvirus particles present, it was agreed by convention that the highest
dilution at which complete agglutination occurred was taken as a measure for the virus concentration in a fluid.
See, A. Isaacs, 'Laboratory methods used in investigating influenza', Glasg. med. J., 1948, 29: 357-61, p. 359.
21 The plasma membrane of these cells had been ruptured by chemical treatment and consequently these red
blood cells had lost their haemoglobin content (pigment).
2) H. Donald and A. Isaacs, 'Counts ofinfluenza virus particles', J.geni. Microbiol., 1954, 10:457-64, p. 459.
22 The nucleic acidcould beeitherDNA orRNA and was present in the virus envelope. Three years afterJames
Watson and Francis Crick had proposed the double helix model for DNA structure and function, the nucleic acid
content ofthe virus had been shown to be the infective component and to play a vital role in viral replication, see
Hughes op. cit., note 13 above, p. 101.
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they would use the same strain ofinfluenza andthesamemethodofviralinactivation thathe
had used successfully in previous interference experiments. Thus, for the greater part, their
initial experimental set-up consisted of materials and techniques which had either been
employed by Isaacs and Lindenmann in earlier experiments, or circulated in the local
context of the division of Bacteriology and Virus Research.23
Standing face to face at the bench in Isaacs' laboratory, Lindenmann, Isaacs and a
laboratory technician began by cutting and washing the chicken embryo membranes, heat
inactivating batches of influenza virus, preparing red cell ghosts, and sticking part of the
inactivated virus to these ghosts. After this preparatory work, they did a first experiment to
see whether or not they could induce viral interference in their test-tubes. Pieces of
membrane were put one by one into the test-tubes together with nutrient fluid and either
virus stuck to red cell ghosts, free inactivated virus, or no virus. The latter was referred to as
the control preparation. After twenty-four hours in a roller-drum the test-tube fluids were
replaced by fresh solutions containing live virus and rolled anew. Half way through the first
week, the amountofvirus in each test-tube was quantified and theexperimental results were
written down in Isaacs' notebook. The results were encouraging and showed that both free
virus and virus stuck to red cell ghosts were able to inhibit the growth of live virus in this
"test-tube arrangement".24 Subsequently, they played around with their experimental
arrangement in order to set the optimal experimental conditions for producing interference
in the test-tube.
On 25 September a first attempt was made to visualize ghosts and virus particles in the
test-tube fluid with the help of the electron microscope. Samples were taken at the start of
the interference experiment and halfway through it, just before the test-tube fluids were
discarded and replaced by fresh solutions and the live virus was added. By special request
Robert Valentine, a researcher from the biophysics and optics department, immediately
processed electron microscopic images of these samples from Isaacs' laboratory. The
pictures of the first sample, taken at the start of the experiment, looked promising. Clearly
visible structures of red cell ghosts with virus particles attached to them could be
distinguished, and Isaacs showed Lindenmann that it was even possible to count the number
of particles per ghost. But the photographs taken after the test-tubes had been rolled for a
time were disappointing. The ghosts looked rather dirty and the electron micrographs were
hard to interpret. They could not tell the difference in structure between virus particles in
samples taken before and after the interference experiment, nor was it possible to tell
whether in an additional control sample without membranes, which contained a mixture of
virus-coated ghosts and empty ghosts, virus particles had become unstuck and transferred to
the empty ghosts. In Isaacs' notebook two question marks serve to highlight the problems of
interpreting these electron microscopic images.25 Despite subsequent attempts to refine the
23 Alick Isaacs to Herman Mooser, letter dated 18 November 1957, Jean Lindenmann to Herman Mooser,
letter dated 7 August 1958, Jean Lindenmann to Herman Mooser, letter dated 13 August 1958, all in Jean
Lindenmann Correspondence, personal archives, Zurich; J. Lindenmann, 'Induction of chick interferon:
procedures of the original experiments', Methods in Enzymology, 78: 181-8, pp. 182-3; J. Lindenmann, 'From
interference to interferon: a brief historical introduction', Phil. Trans. R. Soc. Lond., 1982, series B, 29: 3-5,
pp. 3-4; Lindenmann interview, see note 15 above.
24 Donald and Isaacs, op. cit., note 21 above; Lindenmann interview, see note 15 above.
25 Isaacs, op. cit., note 17 above, 25 September 1956; for a detailed account of the original experiments see
Lindenmann, op. cit., note 23 above, pp. 181-8.
276Interferon and itsfirst clinical trial
experimental procedures, Valentine did not succeed in producing much better images of
ghosts, though there werehintsthatinthe mixtureofvirus-coatedghosts andemptyghosts a
transfer of virus particles from one to the other had taken place.26
According to Lindenmann, "at a certain moment in November 1956, after about two
months of experimentation, Isaacs felt that something unusual was happening while
re-using the test-tube fluid with inactivated influenza virus in a second interference
experiment."27 Contrary to Isaacs' expectation,28 the interfering activity in the test-tube
fluid had not dropped after incubation overnight of a chicken embryo membrane fragment
with inactivated virus. For, when he added a second fresh membrane fragment to the same
test-tube fluid after removal of the first fragment and incubated the tube again, he could
measure about the same degree of viral interference in both membrane fragments. Isaacs
thought that perhaps something like a new interfering activity had been generated.
Lindenmann suggested to himthepossibilitythat theobservedeffectcouldvery wellbe due
to achange in pH orto the absenceofa nutrient in the test-tube. Isaacs, however, was struck
by the idea that, somehow, new interfering activity had been produced, although he
agreed with Lindenmann that the data present did not provide more than a dubious hint
of this. As a joke, Lindenmann gave Isaacs' mysterious interfering activity the name of
"interferon".29
Isaacs' notebookhas an entry for6November 1956, starting withthe sentence: "In search
of an interferon".30 These words marked the decision to change course and test Isaacs'
assumption that a new interfering activity had been generated during their experiment.
From thatday on, they worked long hours tinkering with membranes, viruses and test-tubes
in order to reproduce and amplify the observed effect. In the course of this process, Isaacs'
assumption that new interfering activity had been generated in the test-tube was
substantiated by further data, though more than once they were beset with doubts. There
always remained the possibility that this "interferon" would turn out to be an artefact, a
noise insteadofa signal. Finally, afterconsultation with ChristopherAndrewes, the head of
the division of Bacteriology and Virus Research, and a Fellow of the Royal Society, they
decided that the data were convincing enough for them to write up the results of the
experiment and to submitthem to the Proceedings oftheRoyalSociety. In their two articles
Isaacs and Lindenmann claimed they had found a new interference-inducing factor named
"interferon". This was said to be released in a test-tube fluid following the incubation of
inactivated influenza virus with a piece of chicken embryo membrane. The presence of
interferon in the fluid could be recognized by its ability to induce an inhibitory effect upon
the growth of a number of different viruses in fresh membrane fragments.3'
Inclose collaboration with Lindenmann and the chemist Derick Burke, Isaacs continued
research on this "product ofinfluenza viral interference" or "interference inducing factor",
26 See note 23 above.
27 Lindenmann, interview, see note 15 above.
28 In the early fifties, Isaacs had learned from the interference experiments he had carried out in chicken eggs,
that the interfering activity of a batch of inactivated influenza virus decreased with time.
29 See note 25 above.
30 Isaacs, op. cit., note 17 above, 6 November 1956.
31 See Alick Isaacs and Jean Lindenmann, 'Virus interference: I. The interferon', Proc. R. Soc., 1957, 147:
258-67; and A. Isaacs, J. Lindenmann and R. C. Valentine, 'Virus interference: II. Some properties of
interferon', Proc. R. Soc., 1957, 147: 268-73.
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"interferon". By June 1957 they had shown that it was possible to prepare interferon in
bulk, that it was conceivably a protein, and that it interfered with the growth ofvirus in the
test-tube (in vitro) as well as in laboratory rabbits (in vivo). The latter deserves particular
notice. In 1954 Isaacs had observed that if he injected rabbits intradermally with
inactivated influenza virus, it interfered locally with a subsequent vaccinia virus infection.
When a few years later a fluid, which was believed to contain interferon, appeared
to interfere with the growth of vaccinia virus in a test-tube, Isaacs almost immediately
tried out its effect on the animal model he had used before. Like the inactivated influenza
virus earlier, it showed an inhibitory effect on the growth of vaccinia virus in the rabbit
skin.32
Apart from a private demonstration of interferon's workings at Isaacs' laboratory for
officials of the MRC, interferon's first official appearance was at a meeting of the Swiss
Society ofMicrobiology at the end ofJune 1957. On that occasion, Lindenmann, who had
returned to Switzerland, presented apaperon interferon. However, his claimto have found
a product of the viral interference reaction which could induce an inhibitory effect upon
the growth of live virus in a test-tube did not make much sense to most of the scientists
present. His audience generally considered viral interference to be an interviral inhibition
phenomenon due to the competition between an interfering and a challenging virus
for some key constituent within the cell. The idea ofa viral interfering factor did not seem
to fit into this internationally accepted concept of viral interference. For example, Prof.
Hallauer, one of Switzerland's leading bacteriologists, objected that "as this [interferon]
was utterly new and contrary to all he had read, it must berubbish".33 The only people who
were interested in Lindenmann's paper were a couple of scientists from the
pharmaceutical company Ciba Geigy. They had just started research on interferon, after
Ciba observers in London had learned about its discovery, and wanted Lindenmann to
exchange information with them on this possible lead towards antiviral therapy. So, in a
letter to Isaacs, Lindenmann asked whether he would be against exchanging information
with Ciba researchers.34 Isaacs' reply was quite explicit: "I think it is a very bad idea to
show our manuscript to anyone in a commerical firm. I would be very much against your
doing so in future."35 In a subsequent letter he added:
In this country we are all very sensitive about the fact that penicillin is a British discovery,
but that we have to pay royalties to American commercial firms for every gram of
penicillin we use. I am not suggesting that interferon is in the same class as penicillin but
on general grounds I don't think it is a good thing to deal with commerical firms. It is
much better that they should wait until our information is published and then they can
36 compete on even terms.
32 See the annual report from the bacteriology and virus research group of the NIMR, 10, 1956/57, held at the
NIMR library; J. Lindenmann, D. C. Burke, and A. Isaacs, 'Studies on the production, mode of action and
properties of interferon', Br. J. Exp. Path., 1957, 38: 551-62; and Derick Burke, 'Early days with interferon', J.
Initerferon Res., 1987, 7: 441-2.
3' Jean Lindenmann to Alick Isaacs, letter dated 28 June 1957, Jean Lindenmann correspondence, personal
archives.
3-4 Ibid.
3' Alick Isaacs to Jean Lindemann, letter dated I July 1957, Jean Lindenmann correspondence, personal
archives.
3'' Alick Isaacs to Jean Lindenmann, letter dated 7 July 1957, Jean Lindenmann correspondence, personal
archives.
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As before, there was a tendency amongst academic workers to view collaborative research
with an industrial firm as an intrusion upon their scientific work.37 In addition, Isaacs was
reflecting ageneral feeling amongst government and academic workers that, because ofan
inability to control the patents, penicillin had been given free to commercial drug houses
and, in particular, American commercial firms. To avoid that situation recurring, most
workers proceeded with caution in the case of new findings until the results had been
published or patents had been filed.38
Ciba had to wait until October before the first two articles on interferon were published
in the Proceedings ofthe Royal Society. Initially, these publications aroused only minor
interest. Like their Swiss colleagues, most virus researchers in Britain and America were
sceptical about the validity ofthe findings. They considered the idea of a viral interfering
factor to be at odds with the established view on viral interference as mediated by virus
particles. Moreover, those who overcame their initial doubts and tried to repeat Isaacs' and
Lindenmann's experiments in other laboratories, found them difficult to replicate.
Interferon became nicknamed "misinterpreton".39 Among the small group of "believers",
people who thought ofinterferon as more than some doubtful laboratory artefact, was the
science correspondent of the Daily Express, who phoned Isaacs with a request for
additional information. Although Isaacs refused this, an article was published in the Dail'
Express on the isolation of an antiviral substance named "interferon".40 Following the
article, the pharmaceutical companies Glaxo and Benger Laboratories wrote to the MRC,
urging for a change of name of Isaacs' substance. Since both had got Registered Trade
Marks for products with names similar to interferon, they anticipated difficulties if it were
to be developed as a drug in the future.4' However, far from leading to a change of name,
the article and letters led the MRC (who were quite "penicillin sensitive") to consider
more urgently the patentability of Isaacs' discovery in order to protect the Council's
interest in his work.42 The MRC first consulted their patent adviser at the National
Research Development Corporation (NRDC) to see whether or not the subject-matter was
patentable, with the result that, in May 1958, applications were made for patents in the
United States, Canada and Germany. Unfortunately, it turned out to be impossible to
obtain a British patent because more than six months had elapsed since the first public
"7 According to a 1941 article on pharmaceutical research there was a "tendency amongst academic workers
to view with apprehension whole-hearted alliance with the research of any one firm", see, J. Liebenau, 'The
British success with penicillin', Soc. Stud. Sci., 1987, 17: 69-86, p. 72.
" As a result of the British "failure" to exploit penicillin, the National Research Development Corporation
(NRDC) was set up under the British Industries Act of 1948 to secure the development of inventions resulting
from public research and if necessary to obtain patents for these inventions, see L. G. Matthews, Historn of
pharmacyv in Britain, London, E. & S. Livingstone, 1962, pp. 330-3.
Derick Burke, interview, Norwich, 14 May 1990, Norman Finter, interview, Beckenham, 25 May 1990, and
David Tyrrell, interview, see note 18 above.
40 Alick Isaacs to Jean Lindenmann, letter 23 October 1957, Jean Lindenmann correspondence, personal
archives.
4' Glaxo to MRC, letter dated I November 1957, MRC Archives, File No. A814/17; Benger Laboratories to
MRC, letter dated 28 November 1957, MRC Archives, File No. A814/17.
42 MRC to Sir Charles Harrington, letters dated 6, 29 November, 5 December 1957, MRC Archives, File No.
A814/17; SirCharles Harrington to MRC, letters dated 13 November, 7, 10 December 1957, MRC Archives, File
No. A814/17.
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report.43 Despite the patent applications and further articles in the Lancet and British
Medical Journal, public interest in interferon was slow to develop.44 Interferon began to
be known to the public after Isaacs and Burke had given a public demonstration of its
effects at the Annual Conversazione of the Royal Society, 15 May 1958. The catalogue of
the exhibits to be seen at the Royal Society, contained the following description:
INTERFERON: AN INHIBITOR OF VIRUS GROWTH
It has been known for many years that one virus may interfere with the growth ofa second.
Recently it was found that this interference is mediated through a substance which has
been named 'interferon'. Active preparations of interferon can be easily produced by the
litre without special equipment, and the activity can be readily concentrated. Such
preparations are potent inhibitors of the growth of influenza and related viruses in vitro,
and preparations which have been concentrated 10-fold inhibit the growth of vaccinia
virus on the chick chorioallantoic membrane or in the rabbit skin.45
According to a correspondent of the Daily Telegraph a Fellow of the Royal Society had
said at a press preview: "I find enormous excitement in the promise ofinterferon".46 Next
day the Daily Telegraph, among other newspapers, reported the discovery of a substance
named interferon which might one day play an important part in the fight against viruses.
Isaacs was even asked to repeat the demonstration on television, in a future programme of
'Eye on research'.4 The sudden press coverage of interferon as a potential antiviral
therapeutic did not go unnoticed. Shortly afterwards, the MRC received a letter from the
American pharmaceutical company Johnson & Johnson, which had noted the publicity
surrounding interferon in the UK and was most interested in receiving additional
information on a possible new approach to human viral therapy.48 At the same time, the
MRC was approached by a Glaxo executive about the patent position on interferon.
Together with the American request for research information,49 this provided an important
incentive for the MRC to consult the director of the NIMR, Sir Charles Harrington, with
regard to further action on interferon. Harrington was said to welcome Glaxo's co-
operation if it took the form of supplying interferon in large amounts. Further, he agreed
with the MRC that, together with Glaxo, other pharmaceutical firms should be invited to
co-operate through the Association of British Pharmaceutical Manufacturers (ABPM).50
43 NRDC to MRC, letter dated 24June 1958: ". . . applications covering the interferon invention havebeen filed
in Germany under No. J14535 on March 11, 1958, in Canada under No. 750330 on April 28, 1958 and in the
U.S.A. under No. 734106 on May 9, 1958", MRC Archives, File No. A813/104; Elkington and Fife, consulting
chemists and chartered patent agents, to the MRC, letter dated 20 December 1957, MRC Archives, File No.
A813/104.
44 See editorials, 'A lead towards virus chemotherapy?', Lancet, 1957, i: 931-2; and 'Interferon', Br med. J.,
1957, i: 1102.
41 See the invitation to the Annual Conversazione oftheRoyal Society on 15 May 1958, TheAnnalsoftheRoyal
Society, 1958, I, p. 10.
46 See newspaper article, "'Interferon" may aid fight against flu', Daily Telegraph, 16 May 1958.
47 Alick Isaacs to Jean Lindenmann, letter dated 5 June 1958, Jean Lindenmann Correspondence, personal
archives.
4X The American pharmaceutical company Johnson & Johnson to the MRC and vice versa, letters dated 16, 25
June 1958, MRC Archives, File No. A813/104.
4' A similar informal request had been made by the American drug firm Merck & Co. The latter approached
Isaacs after he had presented a paper on interferon in New York, March 1958. Alick Isaacs to Jean Lindenmann,
letters dated 19 March, 13 May 1958, Jean Lindenmann Correspondence, personal archives.
-" Internal note MRC, dated 4 November 1958, MRC Archives, File No. A813/104.
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Obviously the MRC and the NIMR had become interested in developing and testing
interferon as a drug, but realized that they had not enough resources for the production of
sufficient quantities. Foreign interest in interferon speeded things up and convinced MRC
and NIMR workers that seeking collaboration with a British commercial firm would serve
the common interest.5' The missed opportunity in the UK to develop penicillin was still
fresh in everybody's memory. If interferon were to prove to be the new "antiviral
penicillin", the opportunity should not be lost to develop it in Britain.52 British drug firms
should therefore be first to collaborate on interferon.
On 22 April 1959 at the NIMR, the representatives ofmost British drug companies were
informed about the current state of affairs concerning interferon. Sir Charles Harrington
opened the meeting by pointing out American interest in its development and the MRC's
preference to seek collaboration with British firms first. Subsequently, both technical and
patent matters were discussed in the light ofthe possible therapeutic value ofinterferon.5-3
Alick Isaacs was present to assist Harrington in answering technical questions, while a
patent expert from the NRDC helped to clarify the patent position on interferon. The fact
that the information available was considered insufficient by the American patent
examiner was played down as a mere technicality. Because of lack of evidence on the
drug's utility, the examiner had decided that the patent application for interferon as an
antiviral agent had to be rejected until further research results could be made available.54
Until then drug companies had been very successful in developing antibiotics, such as
penicillin, against a broad range ofbacterial diseases. However, people were still waiting
for the first effective antiviral agent to leave the research laboratories. Apart from vaccines,
virtually no virus therapy was available. Thus the idea that Isaacs had possibly found a
broad spectrum antiviral agent that might be fit for future use in man, was appealing.55 In
the weeks following the meeting, Burroughs Wellcome (Wellcome), Glaxo Laboratories
(Glaxo) and Imperial Chemical Industries-Pharmaceuticals (ICI) informed the MRC of
their willingness to co-operate on a considerable scale.56 A further meeting was required to
convince the MRC thateach ofthe three drug firms would do theirfair share ofthe work in
the collaboration. All three companies stated that there was no limit to the research effort
they were prepared to make. More significant was the fact that Glaxo's representative, Sir
Harry Jephcott, announced that Wellcome and Glaxo were prepared to act as one, hoping
thereby to exclude ICI from collaboration with the MRC.57 The matter was settled at an
informal meeting afewdays laterwhen the MRC made itclearto Jephcott that ICI could not
be arbitrarily excluded ifthe company wished to participate.58 Although I do not know what
* In the case ofpenicillin the image ofinternational competition helped British academic workers to overcome
their initial distrust towards commercial drug firms. It convinced them that collaboration with British commercial
firms would serve the public interest: see, Liebenau, op. cit., note 37 above, p. 75.
512 Interviews with Burke, Finter, Tyrrell, see notes 18 and 39 above.
"' Minutes of a meeting to discuss collaboration in a programme of work on interferon, held at the NIMR, 10
April 1959, MRC Archives, File No. S788/1.
5 Elkington and Fife, consulting chemists and chartered patent agents, to Alick Isaacs, letter dated 9 March
1959, MRC Archives, File No. A813/104.
"' David Wilson, Penicillin in perspective, London, Faber & Faber, 1976.
56 Thepharmaceutical companiesWellcome, Glaxoand ICI tothe MRCand vice versa, lettersdated May 1959,
MRC Archives, File No. S788/1.
S7 Minutesofameetingtodiscusscollaboration in aprogramme ofwork on interferon, held atthe NIMR, 2June
1959, MRC Archives, File No. S788/1.
58 Internal note MRC, dated 5 June 1959, MRC Archives, File No. S788/1.
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made Glaxo and Wellcome act in this way, a reason might be that both had had dubious
experiences with ICI as a collaborator on penicillin. During the Second World War a
consortium of British pharmaceutical companies (including Wellcome, Glaxo and ICI),
incorporated as the Therapeutic Research Corporation (TRC), had collaborated on a
penicillin development programme. However, soon after the war had ended, ICI had
prematurely pulled out of the penicillin programme.59
Yet another meeting with all parties (NIMR, MRC, NRDC, Glaxo, ICI and Wellcome)
was held on 3 July to settle the outlines ofan agreement for a collaborative programme of
further work on interferon. Since the MRC had not taken part in the TRC during the war
and had no experience with a peacetime model for collaboration with the drug industry
either, they had entrusted the NRDC with the task of making proposals for such an
agreement. At the joint meeting, the NRDC proposed to set up an executive body to hold
property, grant licences, and administer the arrangement between all the parties involved.
They also suggested that the NRDC's patent holdings corporation, which had been
founded in 1952 with the aim of carrying out future collaboration between, for instance,
the MRC and industry, should be used forthis purpose. In addition they proposed to set up
a scientific committee, which would come under the executive body and provide a
platform for the exchange of technical information and know-how. Following initial
discussions of these proposals between the MRC, the NRDC and the three drug firms, it
was agreed that an executive body should be set up and that the NRDC's patent holdings
corporation would serve this purpose.60 In addition they agreed on a scientific committee
to consist of research workers from the industrial firms and the MRC under the
chairmanship of Isaacs. This committee was to be responsible for advising the executive
body on the scientific aspects of further work on interferon.6' Work on the drug was
provisionally defined as "work on a viral interfering substance produced by the action of
partially-inactivated virus on a susceptible tissue".62
While negotiations on the clauses in the Collaboration Agreement were still in
progress,63 the scientific committee started discussing a programme of research.
LOOKING BEHIND THE SCENES
In September 1959, under the vigorous leadership of Isaacs,64 the scientific committee
started to review and evaluate recent work on interferon. The following four major research
" Liebenau, op. cit., note 37 above, p. 83.
6() The executive body would be formalized in a GNRD Patent Holdings Ltd with a board made up of
representatives of each of the collaborating firms and the NRDC, under an independent scientific chairman.
61 Minutes ofa meeting todiscusscollaboration in aprogramme ofwork on interferon, held atthe NIMR, 3 July,
1959, MRC Archives, File No. A812/5/1.
62 Proposed agreement with the NRDC on collaboration with some pharmaceutical firms, dated 10July, 1959,
MRC Archives File No. A812/5/1.
6' One ofthe major obstacles in the negotiations was the formulation of a clause on the publication of research
results. It took until April 1961 to reach an agreement.
' Isaacs had suffered a severe bout ofdepression in the winter of 1958-59 and had only recently resumed all his
duties at the World Influenza Centre (NIMR). After his return to work he is said to have changed dramatically in
nature. From an open-minded scientist and skilful experimenter he seemed to have changed to a more speculative
researcher, who was less interested in doing meticulous experiments and who vigorously pursued his own ideas
regarding interferon. Andrewes, op. cit., note 14 above, p. 215; Burke, interview, see note 39 above, and Tyrrell,
see note 18 above.
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problems were singled out.65 First, MRC's research workers had recently observed a
species-specific effect of interferon both in vitro and in vivo. Interferon prepared in chick
tissues appeared to have a much higher antiviral activity when tested in vitro in chick cells
than it did in calfcells. Similarly, chick interferon was found to have a far less protective
effect against vaccinia virus than rabbit interferon when tested in vivo in rabbits. Despite the
fact that this species-specific effect did not seem to be absolute, it could have far-reaching
consequences for future research, if it were to be substantiated by further experiments,
since, experiments on the virus-protective effect ofinterferon in animals, and maybe later in
humans, would require samples ofinterferon that had been produced in cells ofthe same or
a related species.66 Second, the measurement of the antiviral activity, or potency, of
interferon preparations came up for discussion. Apart from assessing different assay
techniques (biological activity tests), the committee discussed the problem of the
comparability of assay data. The antiviral activity of the same interferon preparation had
been shown to differ widely depending on the laboratory, the test method, or the scientist
involved. It was agreed that, in order to facilitate comparative measurements ofactivity in
the collaborating laboratories, each laboratory would put aside some ofits interferon to be
used as a standard preparation in the other laboratories. Third, a number of points were
raised concerning the production ofinterferon. For instance, it was agreed that, in order to
meet future demands for large amounts ofthe drug, more efficient production methods were
required. Moreover, satisfactory methods forthe purification and storage ofinterferon had
yet to be developed. Finally, the difficulties of work with animals, in particular the
translation ofexperiments from the test-tube to the laboratory animal were on the agenda.
Attempts had been made to see if the protective effect of interferon against the influenza
virus in the test-tube could also be demonstrated in mice. In this connection the dose and
intranasal administration of interferon presented difficulties in vivo.
Having outlined these research requirements with the aim ofdeveloping interferon as an
antiviral therapeutic agent in man and animals, the committee decided on a provisional
programme for further work.67 This focused on the development of methods for the
large-scale production and purification ofinterferon. However, in the short term it was felt
essential to examine thoroughly the question of whether or not interferon was species-
specific. Thus, each laboratory would concentrate on preparing interferon from cells of
one species and measure its antiviral activity in cells from other species.
The provisional status ofthe research programme in the scientific committee contrasted
with the way in which a press statement on the collaboration, issued a little later, described
future work on interferon:
The stage has only recently been reached when the necessarv development work that must
precede therapeutic trial could be undertaken.68 [The italics are mine]
65 Minutes of the first and second meeting of the Scientific Committee on interferon, 3, 9 September, 1959,
MRC Archives File No. S788/2/1.
66 A. Isaacs and M. A. Westwood, 'Inhibition by interferon ofthe growth ofvaccinia virus in the rabbit skin',
Lancet, 1959, i: 324-5; D. A. J. Tyrrell, 'Interferon produced by cultures ofcalfkidney cells', Nature, 1959, 184:
452-3.
67 See MRC to Harrington, note 42 above.
68 NIMR to MRC and vice versa, letters on the drafts of a press statement about the interferon collaboration
and its goals, dated 13, 17 November, 15, 31 December 1959, MRC Archives, File No. S788/I.
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The necessary work was said to include both pilot scale production of interferon and
studies ofits effect on experimental virus infections ofanimals. The notion ofuncertainty
had been erased from the statement, thereby presenting the work as a rule-bound
enterprise which was to follow a well-known and necessary path for testing potential
therapeutic compounds. This is not to say that the workin the scientific committee was not
"necessary development work", but that its nature was different. It was beset with
uncertainties and was far less rule-bound than the press statement leads one to suspect.
Until the spring of 1960, research on interferon was carried out, more or less, along the
lines of the provisional programme. The MRC's researchers mainly worked on the
development of a purification method, the problem of the species-specificity, and the
mechanism ofaction. Researchers from the collaborating firms focused on the production
of interferon in cells of different species.69
In the meantime, the definition of the term "interferon" was continuously open to
changes due to negotiations between the various interest groups, as the following two
examples show. Thanks to Isaacs' continuous attempts to bring interferon to the notice of
the international scientific community and his willingness to demonstrate interferon's
workings to visiting researchers, as well as to his international reputation as an influenza
virus expert, a growing number of researchers outside the UK became interested and
started work on interferon. While Isaacs was in the process ofconvincing scientists outside
the local context of the NIMR about the "fact status" of interferon, he was told that the
American virologists John Enders and Monto Ho, and Robert Wagnerhad claimed to have
found substances like interferon. These substances had been given names such as "Virus
Inhibitory Factor" (VIF) and "Interferon B".70 In one of his letters to Lindenmann, who
had also heard about the American situation and feared confusion in the field, Isaacs
indicated that although they could not stop people from using different names for these
substances, they might prevent this from happening in the future by giving a fairly broad
description of interferon. He therefore proposed to use the following definition of
interferon in a paper to be presented at the 'Perspectives of Virology' meeting in New
York in January 1960:
a protein, slightly smaller than antibody globulin, produced by cells of different animal
species following inoculation with inactivated or live virus of many different kinds and
capable ofinhibiting intracellularly the growth of a variety of viruses in cells of the same
animal species, in doses which are not obviously toxic for cells.7'
"I do not think, however, that it would be easy for us to be dogmatic in saying that a
substance with these properties was interferon. It is usually much better to let someone go
his own course and see what happens."72 Isaacs' strategy appeared to be successful,
"9 Minutes of the 3rd and 4th meeting of the Scientific Committee on interferon, dated 26 October,
26 November 1959, MRC Archives, File No. S788/2/1.
70 M. Ho and J. F. Enders, 'An inhibitor ofviral activity appearing in infected cell cultures', Proc. Natl. Acad.
Sci., 1959, 45: 385-6; Alick Isaacs to Jean Lindenmann, letter dated 4 December 1959, Jean Lindenmann
Correspondence, personal archives.
" Isaacs to Lindenmann, letter dated 4 December, 1959, see note 70 above.
72 Ibid.
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because at the 'Perspectives of Virology' meeting in 1961 it was agreed that the name
interferon should be adopted for antiviral factors with the same characteristics as VIF.73
About the same time in Britain in one of the drafts of the collaboration agreement,
"interferon" was described as,
any substance (other than antibodies) which is produced by the interaction of a virus and a
living animal tissue and which is able to prevent, diminish or modify the multiplication of
active viruses in living animal cells.74
This definition, which is formulated in broader terms than the former, evolved from
discussions on the terms of a draft agreement relating to interferon between the
participating parties in the collaboration. The fact that interferon did not denote a clearly
characterized substance was a problem and it was agreed that a satisfactory definition
should serve the purpose ofboth limiting the field ofcollaboration and ofcovering, under
the agreement, as many natural virus-induced substances with antiviral properties as
possible.75 It appeared to be rather difficult to find an acceptable definition which would
be at the same time narrow enough and broad enough to satisfy both scientific and patent
interests. The moment this definition made its appearance in the draft agreement it was
immediately called into question. The NIMR research workers had just claimed to have
found natural virus inhibitors which were different from interferon in that they shared
serological characters with the virus responsible for their production. In order to prevent
these newly discovered substances from being included in the field of collaboration on
interferon, the NIMR urged for the following change in the wording of interferon's
definition:
any substance (other than antibodies) which is produced by the interaction ofa virus and a
living animal tissue and which, whilst it lacks the serological properties of the virus, is
able to prevent, diminish or modify the multiplication of active viruses in living animal
cells.76
Thus, not only was the definition of the term "interferon" continuously affected by
changes due to negotiations between the various interest groups, but it was also highly
dependent upon the context in which it was handled. Modalities which widened or
narrowed the definition were added and dropped on an ad hoc basis.77
At a meeting of the scientific committee in April 1960, after eight months of research,
the provisional research agenda was changed radically.78 During this meeting, research
73 Monto Ho, 'An early interferon: "Viral inhibitory substance",' J. hIterferon Res., 1987, 7: 455-8, p. 456.
74 MRC to NIMR and vice versa, letters with comments on the drafts ofan interferon agreement, dated 23, 31
March 1960. MRC Archives, File No. A812/5/1.
71 Minutesofameeting todiscussthedraftAgreemenitprepared bytheNRDCbetweenGlaxo Laboratories Ltd.,
The Wellcome Foundation Ltd., Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd., the National Research Development
Corporation and GNRD Patent Holdings Ltd. relating to collaboration on interferon, held at The Wellcome
Building, Euston Road, on 27 January 1960, MRC Archives, File No. A812/5/1.
76 MRC to NIMR and vice versa, letter with comments on the drafts of an interferon agreement, dated 23, 31
March 1960, MRC Archives, File No. A812/5/1.
77 LatourandWoolgarhavethoroughlyexamined theaddinganddroppingofmodalities inscientific statements:
see, Latour and Woolgar, op. cit., note 9 above.
71 Minutes of the 6th meeting of the Scientific Committee on interferon, dated 6 April 1960, MRC Archives
File No. 788/2/1.
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workers from the MRC reported the following two research results. First, when testing the
specificity ofinterferon prepared in a variety ofanimal tissues, monkey interferon showed
activity against a range of human and simian cells. In particular, the observation that
monkey interferon appeared to be active against a number ofrespiratory viruses in human
tissue-cultures aroused interest. It was agreed that, although extrapolation from individual
tissues to the complete organism was hazardous, monkey interferon might be fit for future
use in man. Moreover Wellcome's and Glaxo's experience with the production of
poliomyelitis vaccine in large-scale cultures of monkey kidney cells was thought to be
helpful in overcoming problems in the production and safety of monkey interferon.
Second, the purification work on interferon had reportedly resulted in a pure product.
The prospect ofthe production ofsufficient quantities ofpure monkey interferon had a
profound impact on the planning offurther work on interferon by the scientific committee.
Immediately four suggestions were made forfuture experiments with purified interferon in
monkeys and humans:79
1) To test the protective effect against measles infection in volunteers. Since the MRC
was in the process of assessing the effects of attenuated measles vaccine, facilities to test
interferon's effect against measles would be available. However, it was remarked that
measles is a systemic infection and therefore a measles trial would require considerable
amounts of interferon. (This suggestion was made despite the fact that interferon's effect
on measles had not yet been tested in vitro or in vivo.)
2) To test the protective effect of interferon on vaccination against smallpox in
volunteers. There would be enough recruits available who had not yet been vaccinated and
were willing to participate in a trial. Moreover, as a local infection it would need much less
interferon than a systemic infection. (In the previous paragraph I pointed out that
interferon appeared to have an inhibitory effect in the test-tube and on the skin of
laboratory rabbits. Obviously, this experiment would be a translation of subsequent
experiments in vitro and in vivo.)
3) To test the protective effect of interferon on respiratory infections in volunteers. A
majoradvantage ofthis trial was thought to be thefact that the MRC had an official site for
common cold trials in the form of the Common Cold Unit in Salisbury. In addition, the
common cold was a local infection which would require only small amounts ofinterferon.
(As mentioned above, interferon had shown a protective effect against respiratory viruses
in the test-tube and, as such, this experiment would be atranslation ofexperiments in vitro.
Experiments with respiratory infections in mice, however, had not so far been very
successful.)
4) To test the protective effect of interferon on trachoma virus infection in monkeys.
This was considered to be an excellent experiment to do first, as a final check before
experiments on man, and, as a local infection, it would require only small amounts of
interferon. At that moment trachoma virus, which caused local infections in the eye, had
just been cultured at the NIMR, and the MRC was keen on finding a therapy against this
virus disease.80 (Like the measles experiment, this proposal was made despite the fact the
interferon's effect on trachoma had not been tested either in vitro or in vivo.)
79 Ibid.
xo Statement of a senior MRC official during the discussion following the presentation of this paper to the
Twentieth Century Medical History Group, held at the Royal College of Physicians, II February 1992.
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The scientific committee seems to have been keen on having an early demonstration of
interferon's effect on man. It was aware ofthe fact that the American patent examiner had
rejected interferon's patent application on utility grounds, and that if it could be shown to
have an effect on man, even in an experimental infection, this decision would certainly be
reversed. In addition there was a feeling that it would help to keep people interested and
maintain the necessary pressure, because the negotiations on the collaboration agreement
were not finished yet.81 At the same time interferon was looked upon as natural material
that had been shown to be incredibly non-toxic in cells and was therefore expected to be
harmless to humans.82 Since the representatives of the firms did not think it possible to
produce large amounts of interferon in the short term, the committee decided to plan
collaborative experiments for vaccinia, the common cold and trachoma, which would
require only limited amounts of interferon.83 In addition they agreed to carry out the
trachoma experiment on monkeys first.
Thus the committee discussed the preliminary work that was required and the ways in
which its members could be responsible for different parts of the projects. For instance,
David Tyrrell suggested the respiratory virus experiment be carried out at the MRC's
Common Cold Unit in Salisbury, but not without extensive preliminary toxicity tests,
while Wellcome and Glaxo scientists expressed their willingness to start producing large
batches of monkey interferon. All agreed that an early start had to be made with work on
the large-scale production, purification and storage of monkey interferon.
One of the MRC's officials made the following comments on the minutes of this
meeting:
Please see the minutes of the sixth meeting. This collaboration seems to be going very
well. They have purified interferon and now think they have a pure product. They are also
now considering experiments on volunteers. Isaacs thinks that these experiments may take
place about autumn.84
However, Isaacs' prediction that the first experiments on volunteers would be performed
in the autumn of 1961 did not come true. At the next meeting in June, Tyrrell informed the
committee of an experiment with monkey interferon on volunteers that was being carried
out at the Common Cold Unit. A couple ofdays earlier, Tyrrell and afellow memberofthe
committee had inoculated themselves intranasally with a small amount of monkey
interferon they had prepared in their laboratory at Salisbury. The night before the meeting
they had challenged themselves by the same route with Coe virus, a type of
Coxsackie virus, which was known to cause colds in humans. In previous tests this virus
had been shown to cause colds nine times out of ten. A few months later Tyrrell reported
that although his colleague had not had a cold, he had had one, and that the virus had been
isolated from nasal washings of them both. Further, the interferon had not produced
8' The collaboration agreement was signed on 24 October 1960, Memorandum and Articles ofAssociation of
GNRD Patent Holdings Limited, MRC Archives File No. S788/6.
82 John Beale, interview, London, 24 May 1990; interviews with Burke, Finter and DavidTyrrell, see notes 18
and 39 above.
83 No reference was made in the records to the reason for dropping the measles proposal right away.
84 Internal note MRC, dated 24 April 1960. MRC Archives, File No. S788/2/1.
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side-effects. The members of the scientific committee therefore agreed that a formal trial
using volunteers was workable.85
Despite this early small-scale experiment with committee members as guinea-pigs,
Isaacs' timetable for the planned experiments turned out to be over-optimistic. Because of
problems with scaling up production and purification techniques in Wellcome's and
Glaxo's laboratories, it was April 1961 before the first small batch of interferon became
available for initial safety and potency tests.86 The fact that the production of interferon
took much longer and resulted in less than was anticipated put the collaboration within the
scientific committee under strain for a while. Isaacs, in particular, was disappointed by the
slow rate ofprogress. In a letter to the MRC he even spoke about "the feeling that the firms
were dragging their feet".87 During one of the committee meetings he brought the matter
up and proposed to speed up the process by distributing the research work more efficiently
among the different laboratories. However, the other committee members did not share
Isaacs' feelings, although they found it advisable to have a more frequent informal
exchange of information.88 Meanwhile, the trachoma experiment had been cancelled.
According to Isaacs, interferon might not be active against the trachoma agent and it
would be best to concentrate on the vaccinia and common cold experiments.89 Since the
vaccinia experiment seemed to require less preparatory time, it was chosen as the first test
for interferon's activity in humans.
In Britain, at that time, there was no compulsory safety system for testing drugs, and no
unified system of toxity tests for clinical trials which would provide a regulatory context
for experiments with interferon on man. In addition there were no formal rules on how to
carry out a clinical trial.9>) So the committee started with general discussions about the
nature of the safety tests that should precede the trial. They agreed that small numbers of
volunteers should be used before any large-scale trial was performed and that exhaustive
safety tests were needed, but there were differences of opinion about the exact nature of
the tests. Should they apply the same test procedures which were being used in the
production ofvaccines, or should they design a new test protocol? For instance, one ofthe
committee members argued that quarantined animals, which were being used to test the
safety of the polio-vaccine during its production process, would greatly increase the
" Minutes of the 7th and 8th meeting of the Scientific Committee on interferon, dated 24 June, 10 October
1960, MRC Archives, File No. S788/2/1.
"' Minutes ofthe I I th meeting ofthe Scientific Committee on interferon, dated 19 April 1961, MRC Archives,
File No. S788/2/1.
87 Alick Isaacs to the MRC, letter dated 27 October 1961, MRC Archives, File No. S788/2/1. 88 Minutes ofthe 12th and 13th meeting of the Scientific Committee on interferon, dated 5 June, 13 September
1961, MRC Archives, File No. S788/2/1.
" Minutesofthe 9th meeting ofthe Scientific Committee on interferon, dated 5 December 1960, MRC Archives
File No. S788/2/1.
9" Since the start ofthe Health Service in 1948 there had been a committee under Lord Cohen which dealt with
the effectiveness and safety of drugs, but it had almost no real power. The committee found that manufacturers
discharged their responsibilities effectively "within the limits of contemporary knowledge of methods of
testing". The first steps towards a central regulatory agency on drugs safety were taken after the Thalidomide
case (1960-61) with the setting up of a Committee on Safety of Drugs (the Dunlop Committee) in June 1963.
However the functions of this committee did not become compulsory until the Medicines Act of 1968. William
Breckon, The drugmakers, Plymouth, The Bowering Press, 1972, pp. 121-41.
288Interferon and itsfirst clinical trial
expense ofthe project and that it was more important to pay attention to the safety of the
final product.9' On the basis of these discussions, preliminary safety requirements were
drafted for the production of interferon for clinical trials.92 In order to finalize a detailed
test protocol, a special interferon safety test meeting was held with experts from the
MRC's immunological products control laboratory in Hampstead, where a lot of
knowledge and skill in testing the safety ofvaccines had been accumulated over the years
and it was thought that, as a biological product, interferon would profit from this pooled
experience. The test protocol that resulted from the discussions with the experts at
Hampstead required a series of in vitro and in vivo tests, during and after the production
process, so as to exclude the possible presence of bacteria and viruses. The exclusion of
viruses was regarded as particularly problematic, since small quantities of active virus
mightalways be maskedby the presence ofinterferon as apotent inhibitorofvirus growth.
It was agreed that the same methods should be applied as were being used in the
production of vaccines, since no method of excluding viruses was known to be
fool-proof.93
Finally, I should mention two major problems encountered during and after the
vaccination experiment early in 1962. According to the safety protocol of the trial, the
monkey interferon to be used in this experiment was to be subjected to a series of final
toxicity tests which were also used on a routine basis in the production of vaccines. First,
interferon had to be injected in mice and guinea-pigs. Ifno adverse effects were registered
in the laboratory animals, it would be injected into the skin ofthe arms of members of the
committee. If this test was also satisfactory the trial would proceed.94 In practice, the
toxicity tests in mice went satisfactorily, but this was not the case for similar tests in
guinea-pigs, which died within three to four days of an inoculation with interferon.
Consequently, a debate arose within the committee over the safety of interferon. A
Wellcome scientist pointed out that guinea-pigs were known to be highly susceptible to
small amounts of penicillin, and that there might be enough penicillin in the interferon
preparation to be fatal. Penicillin was present in the injections since it was used to prevent
bacterial infection in the large-scale culture ofmonkey kidney cells in which the interferon
was produced. After much discussion, it was ageed that both evidence in the literature and
personal experience pointed to a singularsensitivity ofguinea-pigs to penicillin, and it was
decided to go ahead with the experiment. As a safety measure penicillin-sensitive
volunteers were excluded from the vaccination trial.95
The second problem occurred after the trial. At a routine check of the research results
from the participating laboratories, an MRC official came across oddities in the figures
"i Minutes ofthe 7th meeting ofthe Scientific Committee on interferon, dated 24 June 1960, MRC Archives,
File No. S788/2/1.
92 Minutes ofthe 10th meeting ofthe Scientific Committee, dated 16 February 1961, MRC Archives File No.
S788/2/1;
13 Minutes ofthe Interferon Safety Test Meeting, dated 22 February 1961, MRC Archives, File No. S788/2/1;
Minutes of the I Ith meeting of the Scientific Committee on interferon, date 4 April 1961, MRC Archives, File
No. S788/2/1.
94 Minutes of the 12th, 13th and 14th meetings of the Scientific Committee on interferon, dated 5 June, 13
September, 20 October 1961, MRC Archives, File No. S788/2/1.
'" Minutes of the 15th meeting of the Scientific Committee on interferon, dated 14 December 1961, MRC
Archives File, No. S788/2/1.
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from the Wellcome laboratories. I do not know what made him find them or what they
were, but there was a considerable difference between the data from the NIMR and
Wellcome. At the NIMR 23 volunteers had been vaccinated against smallpox at two sites
on one arm, where they had previously been inoculated with interferon and the control.
There had been 17 volunteers with a lesion at the control site and no lesion (hence
successfully protected) at the interferon site. On the other hand, at Wellcome 19 volunteers
were tested, but only 8 cases were reported with a lesion at the control site and no lesion at
the interferon site.96 At any rate, the official informed Isaacs, who, on closer examination
of the research data, could not escape the impression that Wellcome had tampered with
codes and numbers. Moreover, there had been a failure to blind the observer, since the
observer and the vaccinator were the same person, and, furthermore, the observer also took
part as a volunteer in the trial. In consultation with the scientific committee, Isaacs tried to
cover up for Wellcome's research data in a draft of the research report. However, Dr
Edwards, who had been responsible for the trial at Wellcome, discussed the matter with
him and said that it would be better not to make any reference to the Wellcome data.
Isaacs, in turn, contacted the MRC and asked for advice. The medical officer in charge at
the MRC was not sure himself and told him to discuss the matter with Sir Charles
Harrington. Subsequently, Harrington decided in consultation with the research director of
Wellcome that its research figures should be deleted from the text of the report.97 In the
meantime the original report had been submitted to the Lancet but was being held up until
the matter had been settled. With the "delete decision" in mind it is surprising to see that in
the final Lancet report three Wellcome volunteers can still be found (see Table 1).98
In spite of the excitement in the scientific committee about the outcome, the vaccinia
trial had a negative impact on the interferon enterprise. The managing boards of the three
companies were not at all convinced by the outcome, which they thought was rather
trivial. Interferon had shown only a minor effect in a minor viral disease. Furthermore, it
had cost a lot of money to perform the vaccinia trial. Apart from the high costs of
producing only minute amounts of interferon from monkey kidney cells, the production
process was bedevilled by many technical problems and there was no immediate prospect
of an alternative source for human interferon. It was felt that interferon was not worth the
effort that was being put into it. As a result, the commitment of the three companies to the
interferon enterprise came under pressure.99
At about the same time, the scientific committee embarked on a second experiment with
interferon on human volunteers. This time the committee chose to test the protective effect
of interferon against the common cold. It was argued that if it were to show an effect
against a frequent viral disease like the common cold then interest within the consortium
would be restored. The trial did indeed have a great impact, because, when it became clear
that no effect could be detected, the interest in interferon within Glaxo, ICI and Wellcome
96 Minutes of the 16th meeting of the Scientific Committee on interferon, dated 22 February 1962, MRC
Archives File, No. S788/2/2.
'7 Alick Isaacs to Derick Burke, letter dated 5 April 1962, Derick Burke Correspondence, Norwich, personal'
archives.
'" Internal Note MRC, dated 4 April 1962, MRC Archives File No. A813/127; Scientific Committee on
Interferon, April 28, 1962. Effect of interferon on vaccination in volunteers, Lancet, 1962, i: 873-5, p. 874.
" Interviews with Beale, Burke, Finter and Tyrrell, see notes 18, 39 and 82 above.
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Table 1: RESULTS OF INDIVIDUAL VACCINATIONS IN THE VACCINATION TRIAL
Laboratory Volunteer Site treated with Interferon at
Interferon Control
National Institute for Medical Research D. H. 0 ++ Front
K. R. P. 0 ++ Front
J. S. C. ++ 0 Back
Inoculations: B. B. 0 ++ Back
Dr G. W. Bissett and Dr D. H. Sproull F. C. F. 0 ++ Front
S. S. 0 ++ Front
Observations: K. M. S. 0 ++ Back
Dr A. Isaacs W. J. B. + ++ Front
N. G. B. 0 ++ Front
J. M. G. + ++ Front
A. C. 0 ++ Back
R. C. 0 ++ Back
S. D. D. + ++ Back
B. D. 0 ++ Front
M. H. G. 0 ++ Front
T. G. J. 0 ++ Back
G. A. 0 ++ Back
S. C. 0 ++ Front
J. E. 0 ++ Back
M. G. 0 ++ Back
V. H. ++ ++ Back
J. J. S. + ++ Front
W. F. W. 0 ++ Back
Common Cold Research Unit, Salisbury V. M. B. + ++ Back
A. E. M. G. H. 0 ++ Back
Inoculations: P. K. B. + ++ Front
Dr D. A. J. Tyrrell
Observations:
Dr M. L. Bynoe
Immunological Products Control, J. W. ++ ++ Back
Hampstead D. J. 0 ++ Back
H. H. 0 ++ Front
Inoculations: A. P. + ++ Front
Dr M. Clarke B. H. 0 ++ Front
Observations:
Dr M. M. Winter
Glaxo Laboratories P. L. 0 ++ Back
R. H. 0 ++ Front
Inoculations: A. C. ++ ++ Back
Dr R. J. Andrews R. C. ++ ++ Back
Observations:
Dr A. 0. Hagger
Wellcome Laboratories Mrs G. 0 ++ Front
Mr W. ++ ++ Front
Inoculations: T. M. P. + ++ Back
Dr T. M. Pollock and
Dr W. T. W. Lawson
Observations:
Dr T. M. Pollock
++=Definite take
+=Take, but distinctly smaller than the take at the other site
0=No take
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plummeted. In spite of the fact that the scientific committee argued that the failure was
probably due to the low dosage and the impurity of the preparation, interferon was
regarded by the management as a clinically useless, undefined biological entity, which
only showed an effect in the test-tube and for which no economical production method
was available. Yet the collaboration continued, mainly because the companies felt, as they
expressed in their memoranda, that they had an obligation to the government to do so.
However, there was reluctance within the consortium to spend more money on the
production of monkey interferon and to proceed with tests on humans. Confronted with a
sharp decline in resources and the obvious lack in understanding ofinterferon's action, the
committee shifted attention back to tests on animals and cell cultures.'°°
Even the best crystal-gazer could not have foreseen in 1965 that almost thirty years later
interferon was being prescribed in hospitals all over the world against a number of viral
diseases and, even more surprisingly, against a variety of cancers.
CONCLUSIONS
In retracing the origins of interferon, I have tried to retrieve some of the contingencies
and uncertainties which were faced in and outside the laboratory regarding interferon. To
begin with, I focused on the laboratory practice which was instrumental in shaping
interferon's early profile as an interference-inducing factor, which was said to induce an
inhibitory effect upon the growth of a number of viruses in the test-tube (in vitro) and
against vaccinia virus in the rabbit skin (in vivo). We have seen how the virologists, Isaacs
and Lindenmann, for some time unsuccessfully tinkered with an ad hoc brew ofmaterials
and techniques in order to test the hypothesis that in analogy with bacterial viruses
(bacteriophages) during influenza virus infections, only the virus nucleic acid entered the
host cell, while the virus coat remained outside the cell ("nucleic acid hypothesis"). The
greater part oftheir experimental tools had either been employed in earlier experiments or
circulated in the local context ofthe NIMR. Every new experiment meant a rearrangement
ofthe experimental set-up and hence new uncertainties to the bench workers. Forinstance,
by replacing the chicken egg with a novel in vitro system, it was uncertain whether
virus-coated red blood cells still induced interference. Further, at the very moment Isaacs
observed something unusual happening in the test-tube, an ad hoc judgment had to be
made as to whether or not to pursue this artefact instead offurthertesting the "nucleic acid
hypothesis". The words "in search of an interferon" in Isaacs' notebook marked the
decision to change course and test Isaacs' assumption that new interfering activity had
been generated in the test-tube. Another period of "tinkering" with membranes, viruses
and test-tubes followed. In this process of fine tuning the experimental arrangement the
presence of an interfering factor was readily substantiated by further data, though more
than once Isaacs and Lindenmann were beset with doubts. There always remained the
possibility that this "interferon" would turn out to be a noise instead of a signal.
Once interferon had acquired a rudimentary fact status within the NIMR, attempts were
made to present the "new-born" to the outside world. Initially it got a cool reception from
the scientific community, despite the publication oftwo articles on it in the Proceedings of
the Royal Society. In general, the idea of a viral interfering factor was considered to be at
"' Ibid.
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odds with the established view on viral interference as mediated by virus particles.
Moreover, those who tried to repeat Isaacs' and Lindenmann's experiments in other
laboratories had difficulty replicating them. However, the moment interferon was
presented as an antiviral substance, a potential medical innovation, it gained momentum.
By bridging the gap between laboratory and medical practice interferon gained more
certainty. In particular the penicillin metaphor played a major role in this respect and was
instrumental in mobilizing interest in interferon, principally in the UK.
The first reference to penicillin was made by Isaacs in response to a letter from
Lindenmann, who asked for permission to exchange information on interferon with a
commercial drug firm as a possible way towards antiviral therapy. As we saw, Isaacs
fiercely opposed this request, thereby highlighting the sensitivity in Britain over the fact
that penicillin, which was a British discovery, was developed by American commercial
firms. In doing so Isaacs was reflecting a general feeling amongst government and
academic workers that because of the inability to control the patents, penicillin had been
given away gratis to commercial drug houses, and in particular American commercial
firms. To avoid a recurrence ofthat situation, most workers proceeded with caution in the
case of new findings, until the results had been published or patents had been filed. This
"penicillin sensitivity" subsequently affected the MRC. The latter had been informed
about the discovery of an antiviral substance at the NIMR early on, but no further steps
were taken until the possibility to develop interferon as a drug suggested itself. It was
immediately felt that, in order to protect the Council's interests, interferon should be
patented. The MRC's interest increased even more when, after a public demonstration of
interferon's effects at the Royal Society and the subsequent press coverage, commercial
drug firms, in particular American companies, approached the Council with requests for
information on interferon. If interferon proved to be the new "antiviral penicillin", the
opportunity should not be lost to develop it as an antiviral drug in Britain. However, the
MRC realized it lacked the resources and expertise for such an undertaking and decided
that British drug firms should be the first to collaborate on interferon. Until then, drug
companies had been successful in developing drugs against bacterial diseases. However
the firms were still waiting for the first effective antiviral to leave the research
laboratories. Thus, the idea that Isaacs had possibly found a kind of"magic bullet" against
viruses was appealing. It is not surprising therefore that most British drug companies were
present at a first meeting with the MRC, which was held to inform them about the state of
affairs concerning interferon.
Ultimately Glaxo, ICI and Wellcome told the MRC oftheir willingness to co-operate on
a considerable scale. Then Glaxo and Wellcome were prepared to act as one party in this
work, thereby hoping to exclude ICI from collaboration with the MRC. A possible
explanation for this could have been the unhappy experience of both companies with ICI
as a collaborator on penicillin at the end of the Second World War. However, the MRC
decided it could not arbitrarily exclude ICI. Since the MRC had not taken part in the TRC
during the war and had no experience with a peacetime model for collaboration with the
drug industry either, they entrusted the National Defence Research Corporation with the
task of making proposals for a collaborative agreement with the three drug companies. In
consultation with the firms it was decided to set up an executive body to hold property and
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administer the arrangement, and that a Patent Holdings Corporation would serve this
purpose. Furthermore they agreed on a scientific committee to consist ofresearch workers
from all parties under the chairmanship of Isaacs, to advise the executive body on
scientific matters. It was this scientific committee which was mainly responsible for the
planning and realization of the Lancet trial.
Right from the start the research workers faced difficulties in communicating research
results. Part of the problem was due to the initial distrust between industry and academic
workers, but there was another reason. The antiviral activity or potency of one interferon
preparation had been shown to differ widely depending on the laboratory, the test method
and the scientist involved. In order to handle these variables and reduce the uncertainty
regarding the exchange of research data, the committee agreed to set standards for
interferon tests.'0' In addition there were ambiguities in translating experiments from the
test-tube to laboratory animals, or to humans. Apart from technical uncertainties (e.g.,
differences in dose and route of administration), the transition involved the more
fundamental question of whether or not extrapolation from one organism to the other
could be justified. This uncertainty regarding experimental transitions was handled in a
rather pragmatic way. When scientists reported the observation that monkey interferon
showed an activity against viruses in human cells in the test-tube, it was agreed that
extrapolation from individual cells to the complete organism was hazardous. Yet it was
decided to proceed with experiments in monkeys and humans. The factors involved in this
decision have been shown to be manifold. For instance Glaxo and Wellcome workers had
experience with the large-scale production of biological products (vaccines) in monkey
cells and it was therefore thought that safety and production problems would be
manageable. At the same time it was announced that the purification work on interferon,
which was looked upon as a non-toxic natural material, had resulted in a pure product. In
addition the patent examiner had rejected interferon's patent application on utility grounds
and an effect in man would certainly help to reverse this decision. In the latter case the
political uncertainty concerning interferon's patent position interfered with the uncertainty
in laboratory practice.
With regard to the Lancet trial, the decision to do a first test with interferon on
vaccination against smallpox in volunteers, was largely based on ad hoc criteria and
judgments.'02 Some of these concerned the amount of interferon needed in the trial, the
preparatory time, again the patent situation, and the availability of test objects or facilities.
This is not to say that the decision was unscientific. Ad hocjudgments and assumptions are
part and parcel of science and technology,'03 due to the contingencies and uncertainties
that govern developmental practices. This is especially true for the planning of the
vaccinia trial, since there was at that time no compulsory safety system in Britain for the
testing of drugs and no unified system of toxity tests to allow for clinical trials which
"" For an extensive account of the role of standardization in the development of biologicals, see, Nelly
Oudshoorn, 'The making of the hormonal body', PhD thesis, Amsterdam, 1991.
102 Brian Wynne pointed out the important role ofad hoc rules and judgements in developmental practices such
as clinical trials in: B. Wynne, 'Unruly technology: Practical rules, impractical discourses and public
understanding.' Social Studies of Science, 1988, 18: 147-67, p. 162.
"'- Feyerabend, Garfinkel and Lynch pointed out the central and essential role of ad hoc reasoning in scientific
practices, see Michael Lynch, Art anid artefact in laboratory scientce, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985,
pp. 134-5.
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would provide a regulatory context for experiments with interferon on man. I have clearly
shown that in order to cope with the uncertainties in the preparations for the trial, and
during the trial itself, the scientific committee relied heavily on knowledge and skill
derived, over the years, from testing biological products, in particular vaccines, both
within the companies and the MRC.
My detour behind the scenes of a clinical trial clearly shows that in the future it would
be better to start from the premise that, if anything is evident it is the lack ofself-evidence
in bio-medical experiments and experimental transitions.
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